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BOOK REVIEWS

entirely intelligible and defensible, but to be crucial in making available to
us an understanding of God as being transcendent in a way that, for different reasons, has so eluded Anselmians and negative theologians alike.
What they, and process theologians too, have thought to be a most unlikely
God is in fact the God who created us" (168). Challenges like that deserve
the closest possible attention, even if that should lead us to question many
a cherished presumption. Moreover, those whom Barry Miller's work may
have encouraged to give classical formulations a second look, even to
acknowledge the sophistication they can bring to current debate, would
profit by Harm J. M. J. Goris' Free Creatures of an Eternal God (Leuven:
Peeters, 1996), which also engages contemporary analytic discussions; and
in a more theological vein, Thomas Weinandy's recent Does God Suffer?
(Notre Dame IN; University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).
NOTES
1. For alueid aeeount of the implieations for faith and for philosophy of
"the distinetion" of ereator from ereatures, see Robert Sokolowski, God of Faith
and Reason (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982 /
Washington DC: Catholie University of Ameriean Press, 1993)

Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas, by John I. Jenkins, C.S.C.
Cambridge, 1997, Pp. xv, 267.
PATRICK LEE, Franciscan University of Steubenville.
Aquinas's doctrines on knowledge and faith, Jenkins argues, have been
misunderstood. He has been read as if answerin.g modern questions, and
so his own "conceptual framework" has been largely ignored. Specifically,
many have misunderstood Aquinas's view of scientia and how that affects
his views of theology (sacra doctrina), the purpose and structure of the
SUl1zma Theologiae, and the light of faith. His book is an attempt to remedy
these defects.
The book covers a lot of ground, and does so interestingly and competently. The reader will find treated here not only the subjects just n1entioned, but also Aquinas's basic theories of epistemology, free choice,
nature, will, appetite, and principles of naturallaw.
The main task of the book is to explain how according to Aquinas theol- .
ogy is a scientia, or an Aristotelian episteme. This has more than antiquarian
interest. Aquinas's view of theology at first seems rather dry: to say it is a
science, even in the Aristotelian sense, seems a straight-jacket. But when
one understands how according to Aquinas theology is a sharing in the scientia of God himself, Aquinas's position emerges as both an exalted view
of theology's dignity and a frank acknowledgn1ent of its limitations.
According to Aquinas, following Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, scientia is
an understanding of why things have the necessary properties they havean understanding "not just of the fact, but of the reasoned fact." For exampIe, to know that metals readily conduct heat and electricity is not scientia,
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but to Lmderstand why they do so iso Understanding this involves grasping
a particular type of syllogism, a demonstration that explains the proper reason why metals have their properties, in other words, a demonstration in
which the premises state the necessary and proper cause and the conclusion
states the effect. A rough (contemporary) example: Metals readily conduct
electricity (conclusion), because metals are substances composed of free
electrons (premise stating the proper cause). Moreover, following Aristotle,
Aquinas insists that one has scientia only if the premises in one's demonstration are necessary, are known better than the conclusion, and one's knowledge of the cOl1.clusion is the cause of one's knowledge of the effect.
The difficulty for this account of scientific knowledge is that, except in
mathematics, the causes never seem to be better known than the effects.
Indeed, a cel1.tral tenet of Aquinas (and Aristotle) is that substances are
known through their actions, not by direct intuition. Thus Aristotle and
Aquinas recognize that in natural science one initially, at least, understands better the effects, and indeed one infers to the nature of tl1.e cause
through the effects. These are called demonstrations quia (from effect to
cause), as opposed to demonstrations propter quid (from the proper and
inlmediate cause to the effect). And of course something similar occurs in
metaphysics. So in non-mathematical sciences one often begins with quia
demonstrations (a proof that a metal is a substance composed of free electrons) before arriving at propter quid demonstration (an explanation why
metals have tl1.eir properties, based on their intrinsic nature).
Jenkins argues that for Aquinas (and Aristotle), this difficulty is resolved
by one's seeing that one does indeed (outside mathematics) initially know
the effect better than the cause. But in a second stage, one COl1.structs a
propter quid demonstration (from proper and immediate cause to effect);
and one then achieves a "cognitive re-structuring." That is, after obtaining
the propter quid demonstration, one acquires such a familiarity with the
causes in the field under study that one comes to understand the effects on
the grounds of the causes (45-50). This requirement for scientia-that the
causes be (or come to be) better known than the effects-has been ignored
by commentators, says Jenkins, but it has important consequences for
Aquinas's understanding of theology.
But there are difficulties in accepting that theology, sacra doctrina, is truly
a scientia. For the principles of theology are the articles of faith, professed in
the creed. The causes are not better known than the effects. And the principIes are believed, not known. Aquinas's answer to these difficulties is that
theology is a subalternated science. It accepts its principles from a higher science. For example, optics is a genuine science but it accepts its principles
from geometry, and so it is subalternated to geometry. Theology, says
Aquinas, is subaltemated to the science which God himself possesses.
Yet difficulties remain. M.D. Chenu argued that Aquinas himself, if only
in one passage in his Commentary on the Sentences, admitted that theology
was onlya "quasi-subaltemated" science. And Chenu argued that theology
does not fit the Posterior Analytics' notion of science--even a sub-altemated
one-because it does not have a subject matter distu1.ct from the superior
science whence it borrows its principles. Moreover, the propositions in theology are not universal (they concem God, the Incamation, etc.), and many
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of them are not necessary (since God freely became man, for example).
Jenkins answers these difficulties by first pointing out that in Aquinas
the term "scientia" is used analogously, and applied not only to human science, but also to divine an.d angelic knowledge. Significantly, God's scientia is not concemed only with universal and necessary truths, but is of singular, contingent and temporally indexed truths as well (63). The Posterior
Analytics presented the requirements of human scientia. H1.1man scientia
must be of the universal and necessary: since humans know things
through their actions on their senses, they can have "certa cognitio rei" (certain knowledge of a thing) only if (in the aspect in which. it is understood)
the thing known cannot be otherwise and cannot change. But this is not
true of divine scientia. God knows things other than hirnself by causing
them-as a craftsman knows his product. And since God is outside of
time, what is future and thus undetermined with respect to us is not
future, and so is in a way present, with respect to God. And God knows it
as present to hirn. Hence God knows even singular, temporally conditioned, and con.tingent entities with a certain and infallible knowledge (65).
Divine scientia is perfect knowledge and involves a knowing of why
things are as they are, and thus fits the core requirements of scientia as set
out in Posterior Analytics. Yet divine scientia is not discursive, not obtained
from sensation, not confined to the universal and necessary, and not
obtained by demonstration. Thus it is clear that the secondary requirements of scientia set out in Posterior Analytics apply only to hun1an scientia.
But theology is not a purely human scientia. Humans cannot naturally
know God's l1ature, mind or decisions, and so they can acquire knowlege
of these-which constitute the principles as it were of divine scientia-only
by faith. So, theology obtains its principles by faith, that is, by accepting
them fron1 God, who has divine scientia of them. Thus, tlleology is a participation in divine scientia, and as such has some of its characteristics, though
in only an imperfect manner. In theology humans begin to see even singular and contingent facts in the manner in which God understands them, for
example, as directed to his plan. Thus, "sacred doctrine [theology] differs
from merely human scientiae ... not because it is deficient or merely quasi
scientia, but because in it humans participate, albeit imperfectly, in the
highest and most perfect scientia, that of God" (76).
Only if the act of faith does involve areal sharing in God's scientia will
the above interpretation of Aquinas make sense. Thus Part 2 defends this
interpretation of theology by examining the manner in which its principles
are grasped, namely, through the "light of faitll."
Before interpreting Aquinas on the light of faith, Jenkins presents his
interpretation of Aquinas on the natural light of the intellect. By tllis light,
says Jenkins, one's basic nat1.1ral beliefs (perceptual and self-evident) are
justified and have warrant. According to Jenkins, Aquinas holds that first
principles and perceptual judgments are basic (self-justified) al1d have an
externalist warrant. That is, they are warranted because they result from
the proper operations of faculties naturally oriented (designed by God) to
arrive at truth.
Jenkins rightly rejects the naturalist interpretation of Aquinas on faith.
On the naturalist interpretation, the act of faith rests on natural argu-
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n1ents-arguments of credibility-showing the fact that God has revealed.
A consequence of the naturalist view is that one's certainty could rise no
higher than the arguments of credibility, and those attain only to "moral"
certainty, that is, certainty sufficient only for practical decisions. Jenkins
successfully shows this is inaccurate: for Aquinas, the credibility arguments playa role in assent (according to Jenkins, they only dispose one to
be attentive to what is preached), but they are not sufficient motives for the
absolutely firm assent of one who has the supernatural virtue of faith.
Perhaps the standard interpretation of Aquinas is the one Jenkins calls
"voluntarist." Faith is an act of assent to what is testified to or revealed,
not what is seen. The voluntarist interpretation is that the will freely
moves the intellect to assent, for the sake of the good or the promise of
eternal life. Jenkins refers to Eleanor Stump and James Ross as proponents of this interpretation.
Jenkins calls his own interpretation "supernaturalist externalism." On
this interpretation the lumen jidei, the infused light of faith, plays a central
role. Aquinas writes: "Faith can be called an argument [that is, evidence]
insofar as the infused light, which is the habit of faith, makes manifest the
articles [of faith], just as the intellectuallight makes principles naturally
known" (quoted by Jel1kins at 190, from the Commentary on the Sentences).
On Jenkins' interpretation, by the supematurallight of faith one perceives
that the gospel is divinely revealed, and so one's act of faith is warranted.
That is, one's act of faith is not motivated by reasons or Sigl1S of credibility
(for example, one's awareness of miracles, or historical arguments, and so
on); these do playa role, but only that of paving the way, or removing
obstacles. They are not intrinsic motivating factors in the act of faith.
Jenkins says: "[B]y virtue of the infused light of faith and witl'l tl'le theological virtue along with the Gift of Understanding, the prospective believer,
by a nOl'l-discursive intuition, understands the articles of faith as propositions to be believed on divine authority and to which he should adhere in
spite of considerations to the contrary."
Why is this act epistemically justified? How is it epistemically warranted? (These two are not the same. Justification refers to grounds of one's
belief, of which one must be aware. Following Plantinga, Jenkins means
by warrant that feature which, added to true belief, renders it knowledge:
for Jenkins, this involves proper functioning of one's cognitive powers.) It
is justified, says Jenkins, as abasie belief-its justification does not depend
on any other beliefs. And it is warranted, he says, "at least in part, because
A) the individual's cognitive faculties have been heightened so that they
l'lave acquired a design with which he can discover the truth about putative divine revelations (i.e. as to whether or not they are genuine) and
because (B) the individual's assent to the articles was produced and is sustained by such heightened cognitive faculties when operating properly."
(197)
BLlt if faith involves a perception, by the light of faith, that the gospel is
divinely revealed, how can it also be voluntary, as Aquinas insists it is?
Indeed, this is perhaps the chief reason interpreters such as Ross and
Stump have concluded that for Aquinas the act of faith is not epistemically
justified. They reasol'led that, being voluntary, it must not be epistemically
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justified, and so the will must "bridge the gap" in the evidence.
Jenkins' answer is that the act of faith is free because the perception of
the divine origin of the gospel requires a good (or at least open) character,
and this character is freely formed. He points out that Aquinas has a
diachronie, not synchronie, view of freedom.
On a synchronie view, a choice is free orlly if one could, at the moment of
choice, choose another option. However, Aquinas has a diachronie view.
"[W]hether a prospective end appears good to a person depends upon his
character, which consists of habits. But since this character has been produced by past free actions, whatever appears good to hirn because of his
character is also voluntary, even though he may not, at the moment of
choice, have any control over this character and how things appear to
hirn." (206) Jenkins argues that a person has a diachronie voluntariness or
freedom in the act of faith. Tl1rough the supematural gift of faith one is
moved to grasp the articles as divinely revealed and to be believed. "If one
is of a bad character, however, this understanding may be obscured or
repressed. If one is, for instance, proud, assent to the articles may appear
bad to one, for faith requires that one's intellect be subject to God's teaching." (208) It is, Jenkins explains, very much a matter of what one focuses
on. A person's pride, or other vices, leads hirn to focus on apparent
implausibilities of the claims of faith. Tl1us, the will's role is not to traverse
a gap in evidence (as the voluntarists argue) but, "the will plays a role
because in most cases it, and our habits and character which are shaped by
it, influence the way we evaluate the evidence." (208) In my judgment this
suggestion is importal1t: whether one accepts his interpretation as a whole,
this view of faith's voluntariness-diachronic rather than synchronicseems to be a more accurate description of how acts of faith occur. Jenkins
points out that an interesting view of the relation between virtue and epistemic merit is implicit in Aquinas's account. "He seems to imply that
moral virtues and vices, which enable us to act weIl or poorly in non-epistemic matters, also enable one to act weIl or poorly in attaining the epistemic goal of believing truths and disbelieving falsehoods." (209)
I believe Jenkins' case for his interpretation in the first part is basically
sound, even though I doubt that Cartesian views of certainty had a central
role in previous inaccurate or less than adequate interpretations.
The second part has some interesting proposals, but it provokes some
questions. First, while I think his explication of a diachronie view of freedom is significant and that it undoubtedly makes a difference to our view of
faith, still, I am not convinced that his interpretation of the role of the will in
faith in Aquinas is accurate. On Jenkins' view the will seems to play only
an indirect role in the act of faith. On Jenkins' interpretatiol1, one's bad
character could block one's seeing the divine origin of the gospel; but once
one sees, by a supernaturallumen fidei, that it has a divine origin, there
seems no need any more for any action of the will. But Aquinas describes
the act of faith as an act of the intellect, moved by the will (Summa
Theologiae, 11-11, q. 4, a. 1). Moreover, Aquinas describes this act of the will as
being motivated by adefinite good (while the intellect is moved by a truth),
namely, the promise of etemallife (Ibid, q. 5, q. 2). That seems to suppose
some sort of definite act of the will, as opposed to just a good character.
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Secondly, I am not convinced that on Aquinas's view the motives or signs
of credibility are as extrinsic to the act of faith (merely disposing one to be
attentive) as Jenkins' interpretation claims. He certainly is right in rejecting
the naturalist interpretation, but on Aquinas's view it seems that the light of
faith enables one to see or appreciate the signs of credibility themselves.
Jenkins is right that this often occurs by an immediate, non-discursive perception. But what one might perceive, by the light of faith, and one's free
will disposing one to see, is the sublin1ity of the teaching, or the miraculous
character of the liturgy or the life of the Church, or so on. In other words, the
signs of credibility themselves are either perceived in a certain way through
the light of faith, or obscured by one's pride or other vices.
Thirdly, while it is difficult to apply contemporary classifications to a
medieval thinker, still, I doubt that Aquinas can be categorized as neatly as
Jenkins does (following Eleanor Stump) as an externalist regarding epistemic warrant. I doubt this because Aquinas's notion of propositional
knowledge as a knowing that one knows, and thus as essentially reflexive,
seems to include in the completed act of knowing an implicit awareness of
the essential orientation (or design) of the intellectual act and of the intellect to truth (see, e.g., On Truth, Q. 1, article 9, Summa Theologiae, Pt I, Q. 16,
a.2). Awareness, on some level, of signs of credibility, while not the sole or
even the primary mover (motive) in the act of faith, do seem to play for
Aquinas an essential role in helping to assure the believer that his act is not
done lightly (leviter)-see Summa Theologiae, Pt. 11-11, q. 2, a. 9, ad 3).
This is a very worthwhile book. It accon1plishes many things, among
them, setting out an original interpretation of Aquinas's notion of sacra doctrina, or theology, and an interesting, provocative interpretation of hirn on
the light of faith. The book also bears witness to the tremendous wealth
and depth of Aquinas's work.

Faith and Understanding, by Paul Helm. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1997. Pp. viii, 212.
SANDRA MENSSEN, University of St. Thomas
This book examines and evaluates the relationship between faith and philosophy as that relationship is expressed in the tradition of "faith seeking
understanding." The first three chapters offer a general survey and exposition of the tradition. The last five chapters consider case-studies, particular
exemplificatiol1s of the tradition: Augustine's account in the Confessions of
time and creation, Anselm's understanding of faith and reason in the first
four chapters of the Proslogion, Anselm's ul1.derstanding of the incarnation,
Jonathan Edward's account of original sin, and John Calvin's notion of the

Sensus Divinitatis.
Heln1 holds, together with the classical proponents of the faith-seekingunderstanding tradition, that philosophy is a help-mate rather than an
enemy of faith. I am entirely in agreement with hirn here. In fact, the point
seems to me somewhat more obvious than Helm takes it to be. (Perhaps I

